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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction for this appeal is conferred upon this Court by
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(k).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.
those

Were the trial court's Findings of Fact, specifically

challenged

by

plaintiff,

adequately

supported

by

the

evidence. A trial court's factual findings are given considerable
deference because of the trial court's ability to assess the
witnesses credibility and will not be disturbed on appeal unless
they are clearly erroneous. Findings of fact are clearly erroneous
if they are against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the
appellate court reaches a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made. Western Capital & Securities v. Knudsvig.
768 P.2d 989, 991 (Utah App. 1989).
To mount a successful attack on the trial court's findings of
fact, it is an appellant's burden to marshall all of the evidence
in support of the trial court's findings and then demonstrate that
despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in
support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence. When an
appellant fails to meet this burden, the trial court's findings are
accepted as valid. Saunders v. Sharp, 793 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah App.
1990).
2.

Did the trial court err in its interpretation of U. C. A.

§ 78-14-4. A trial court's conclusions of law are examined by the
appellate court for correctness and are accorded no particular
deference.

Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah App. 1990).

3.

Did the trial court err in finding as a matter of law

that the continuing treatment doctrine was not applicable to this
case and was not applicable in Utah since the passage of U.C.A.
§ 78-14-4. A trial court's conclusions of law are examined by the
appellate court for correctness and are accorded no particular
deference.

Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah App. 1990).
DETERMINATIVE LAW

Utah

Code

Annotated

Malpractice Act.

§

78-14-4

of

the

Utah

Healthcare

(Attached as Addendum "A").
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This

is

a medical

malpractice

action

arising

from

the

performance of the second of three stages of ileoanal anastomosis
surgery on plaintiff G. Kevin Jones by James M. Becker, M.D. ("Dr.
Becker") on February 27, 1984.

(R. at 2-10).

At the time of the

procedure, and at all other relevant times, Dr. Becker was a full
time employee and faculty member in the Department of Surgery at
the University of Utah Medical Center. (R. at 463-464) .

All

surgeries and treatment performed and rendered by defendants were
provided at the University of Utah Medical Center.
Plaintiff's Notice of Intent to Commence Action was served on
December 4, 1987.

(R. at 3). A request for prelitigation review

was filed by plaintiff on January 15, 1988.
action was commenced April 26, 1988.

(R. at 3).

(R. at 2-10).

This
After

significant discovery, this matter was tried to the trial court,
without a jury, on November 12, 13 and 25, 1991.

In accordance

with § 78-12-47, UCA (1953 as amended) the trial was bifurcated and
-2-

limited

to

the

issues pertaining

limitations defense.
The

trial

to defendants' statute of

(R. at 976).

Court's

Decision

following

the

limitations trial was rendered on December 18, 1991.
1054; Attached as Addendum "B").

statute

of

(R. at 1046-

Findings of Fact and Conclusions

of Law were entered by the trial court on January 23, 1992.
1083-1089; Attached as Addendum "C").

(R. at

After hearing the arguments

and evidence presented by both parties, and reviewing the trial
briefs

submitted

by

the parties, the

trial

court

dismissed

plaintiff's action due to the fact that it was not commenced within
the time required by § 78-14-4.

(R. at 1083-1089).

The trial

court found that plaintiff's action was time barred because it was
not commenced within two years after he knew and reasonably should
have known of his alleged injuries and that he might have a cause
of action against defendants.

(R. at 1083-1089).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

In 1977 plaintiff graduated from law school and commenced

employment as a lawyer with the federal government in Alaska.

(R.

at 848).
2.

During

1980,

while

in

Alaska,

experiencing gastrointestinal problems.

began

He consulted a physician

in Alaska and was treated with Azulfadine.
3.

plaintiff

(R. at 848).

In November 1980 plaintiff moved to Utah.

In Utah his

gastrointestinal problems persisted and he consulted Dr. J. P.
Hughes,

a

gastrointestinal

surgeon,

Dr.

Lynn

L.

Wilcox,

a

gastroenterologist, and subsequently Dr. Clifford G. Harman, a
-3-

gastroenterologist. Dr. Harman has treated plaintiff from 1981 to
the present.
4.

(R. at 848).

In 1981 Dr. Hughes, Dr. Wilcox and Dr. Harman diagnosed

plaintiff's condition as chronic ulcerative colitis.

Dr. Harman

treated plaintiff medically with a drug called Azulfadine and
Prednisone, a steroid.
5.

Ulcerative

(R. at 848, 1083a).
colitis

is

a

serious,

potentially

life

threatening, inflammatory bowel disease. The cause of the disease
is unknown.

The standard medical therapy is Azulfadine, steroids

and a regulated diet.
6.

(R. at 848).

If the disease is not controlled by the standard medical

therapies, surgery is necessary. Ulcerative colitis affects and is
limited

to

the

mucosal

lining

of

the

colon

and

rectum.

Traditionally, the surgical treatment was removal of the colon and
rectum and creation of an abdominal stoma and ileostomy.

The

retained small bowel was attached to the abdominal wall and emptied
into a bag worn externally by the patient.
7.

(R. at 848-849).

In the early 19 80s a new and promising surgical procedure

was available for ulcerative colitis patients.

This procedure,

generally known as an ileoanal anastomosis or ileoanal pull through
procedure involves the standard colectomy (removal of the colon),
but only the mucosal

lining of the rectum is removed, thus

preserving the rectal muscle and anal sphincter function. A pouch
(generally a "J" pouch) is created in the distal end of the small
bowel and the bowel is connected to the rectum.
8.
three

(R. at 849).

The above procedure is generally performed in two or

steps, requiring

a

temporary
-4-

ileostomy.

The

obvious

advantages of this procedure over the traditional colectomy,
proctectomy and ileostomy are (1) the patient does not permanently
require an external appliance or bag and (2) the anal sphincter
function and some degree of continence is maintained.
9.

(R. at 849) .

With the new procedure, the surgical risk of damage to

nerves controlling sexual function is theoretically decreased
because the surgery in the rectal area is performed inside the
rectum with the rectal muscle between the nerves and the operative
site. However, sexual dysfunction has been reported following the
procedure, but less often than with the traditional proctectomy.
(R. at 849).
10.

In approximately 1982 plaintiff became aware of the

ileoanal anastomosis procedure and that Dr. James Becker was
performing this new procedure at the University of Utah.

(R. at

849-850).
11.

In November 1982 plaintiff consulted Dr. Becker at the

University of Utah School of Medicine concerning surgical options
for his ulcerative colitis, including specifically the ileoanal
anastomosis procedure.
12.

(R. at 850, 1083a).

Around Christmas time in 1982 or during the summer of

1983 plaintiff's mother and father came from Alaska to Utah and
visited with Dr. Becker concerning surgical options for treating
plaintiff's ulcerative colitis and specifically concerning the
ileoanal anastomosis procedure.
13.

(R. at 850, 1083a).

In October 1983 plaintiff visited Dr. Kenneth Huizenga,

a gastroenterologist at the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota.
Dr. Huizenga confirmed plaintiff's diagnosis of chronic ulcerative
-5-

colitis and plaintiff was accepted into a study protocol for
investigation of a new drug (5ASA) for the treatment of ulcerative
colitis.
14.

(R. at 850, 1083a).
Plaintiff's disease did not respond favorably to the 5ASA

therapy and Dr. Huizenga had no other medical treatment to offer.
He arranged, however, a surgical consult for plaintiff with a
colorectal surgeon at Mayo Clinic.

Plaintiff met with Dr. Roger

Dozois who explained the surgical options to him, including the
ileoanal anastomosis.
15.

(R. at 850, 1083a).

In December 19 83 plaintiff's ulcerative colitis could no

longer be controlled by medical therapy and became so severe that
he

was

admitted

to

Holy

Cross

Hospital

gastroenterologist, Dr. Clifford Harman.

by

his

treating

In the opinion of Dr.

Harman, medical therapies had been exhausted and surgery was
necessary

to save plaintiff's

life.

Dr. Harman recommended

transfer to the University Hospital for surgery.

(R. at 850,

1083a).
16.

In January 1984 plaintiff and his parents discussed the

surgical options with Dr. Becker. Plaintiff elected to undergo the
ileoanal

anastomosis

procedure

after

having

been

informed

concerning the risks and benefits of that procedure and of the
alternative procedures.

(R. at 851, 1048-1049, 1083a-1084, 1201-

1202, 1204, 1209-1210, 1224).
17.

Dr. Becker advised plaintiff that the risk of sexual

dysfunction was lower with the ileoanal anastomosis procedure than
with the alternative procedures, but that sexual dysfunction was a

-6-

risk of the procedure.

(R. at 1048-1049, 1084, 1201-1202, 1204,

1224)•
18.

In January 1984 Dr. Becker recommended performing the

ileoanal anastomosis procedure in three steps because plaintiff was
so ill.

(R. at 851, 1084).

19.

On January 5, 1984, the first phase of the ileoanal

anastomosis, removal of most of the colon and the creation of a
temporary ileostomy, was performed by Dr. Becker on plaintiff. (R.
at 851, 1084).
20.

The first phase of the procedure was completed without

complications.
to

the

second

Following completion of the first phase and prior
phase

of

the procedure, plaintiff

masturbated to test his sexual function.
relieved and stated

phase

of

At that time he felt

"at least I got through that one okay",

referring to the first surgery.
21.

claims he

(R. at 1049-1050, 1084).

On February 27, 1984, plaintiff underwent the second
the

ileoanal

anastomosis

procedure,

the

mucosal

proctectomy or removal of the mucosal lining from the rectum.
Again, prior to this procedure

the risks were explained

to

plaintiff by Dr. Becker, including the risk of sexual dysfunction.
(R. at 851, 1084, 1224).
22.

In April or May

1984 plaintiff

discovered what he

perceived to be sexual dysfunction, including lack of ejaculation
and diminished frequency and quality of erections.

(R. at 851,

923-929, 1047-1050, 1084, 1731, 1864-1869).
23.

In May 1984 plaintiff reported his perceived sexual

dysfunction to his parents and to Dr. Becker.
-7-

At that time he

reported to Dr. Becker that he had been told by his family doctor
that he might be impotent, secondary to his surgery.

(R. at 882,

923-929, 1047, 1085, 1152-1153, 1731, 1864-1869).
24.

In

May

1984

Dr.

Becker

referred

plaintiff

to

Dr.

Middleton, a urologist, and to Dr. Hammond, a psychologist and sex
therapist, to explore the reported sexual dysfunction.

(R. at 953-

957, 1050, 1085, 1731, 1870-1873).
25.

Since April or May 1984, plaintiff has had ill defined

sexual dysfunction, the cause of which has not been definitively
determined.
26.

(R. at 1048, 1085).

Beginning in May 1984, in discussions and correspondence

with various physicians, plaintiff repeatedly causally related his
perceived sexual dysfunction to his second operative procedure
performed in February 1984.
27.

(R. at 1085).

During the years 1984 and 1985 plaintiff considered suing

defendants for medical malpractice based on his perceived sexual
dysfunction and general dissatisfaction with the outcome of his
surgeries.

(R. at 905-906, 1052, 1086, 1319-1320, 1552, 1580-

1582) .
28.

On June

28, 1984 the

third

and

final phase

of

the

ileoanal anastomosis was performed (attachment of the small bowel
to the rectum) and completed.
29.

(R. at 851, 1086).

All surgeries and treatment performed and rendered by

Defendants were provided at the University of Utah Medical Center.
(R. at 851, 1086) .
30.

Within the State of Utah, this surgical procedure was

available for adult patients only at the University Hospital and
-8-

Dr. Becker was the only physician in the state performing the
procedure at the time plaintiff underwent his surgery.

(R. at

851) .
31.

Dr. Becker was at all times relevant hereto a full time

employee and faculty member in the Department of Surgery at the
University of Utah Medical Center.
32.

Plaintiff's Notice of Intent to Commence Action was

served on December 4# 1987.
33.

(R. at 463-464, 1086).

(R. at 3).

A request for prelitigation review was filed by plaintiff

on January 15, 1988.

(R. at 3).

34.

This action was commenced on April 26, 1988.

(R. at 2-

35.

After significant discovery, this matter was tried to the

10) .

trial court, without a jury, on November 12, 13 and 25, 1991. In
accordance with § 78-12-47, UCA (1953 as amended) the trial was
limited

to

the

issues pertaining

limitations defense.
36.

to

defendants'

statute of

(R. at 976).

The trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, dismissing plaintiff's claim, were entered on January 23,
1992.

(R. at 1083-1089).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1,

Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden in his brief of

marshalling all of the relevant evidence presented at trial which
supports the trial court's Findings of Fact and demonstrating that
despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in
support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence.
-9-

Instead, plaintiff has set forth those facts and testimony which he
believes support his view of the facts and argues that there is
evidence

contradicting

the trial court's Findings.

When an

appellant fails to meet this burden, the trial court's findings are
accepted as valid.

Thus, the trial court's Findings of Fact in

this instance should be affirmed.
2.

The trial court's findings of fact, specifically those

challenged by plaintiff, are valid and supported by the evidence
and should be affirmed.

The trial court's factual findings should

be given considerable deference because of the trial court's
ability to assess the witnesses credibility.
The evidence established that plaintiff did not accept or rely
upon any other theories of causation of his perceived problems.
Moreover, plaintiff presented no evidence that he was ever misled
or deceived about the cause of his problems. In fact, the evidence
establishes that plaintiff believed that his problems were caused
by his surgery and considered suing defendants during 1984 and 1985
for medical malpractice based on his perceived sexual dysfunction.
Plaintiff does not challenge the trial court's finding that
since May 1984, in discussions and correspondence with various
physicians, he repeatedly causally related his perceived sexual
dysfunction to the second operative procedure performed in February
1984.

He also does not challenge the finding that in May 1984 he

reported his perceived sexual dysfunction to his parents and Dr.
Becker, and that he reported to Dr. Becker that he had been told by
his family doctor that he might be impotent, secondary to his
surgery. In light of these admitted facts, plaintiff's later claim
-10-

that he had no knowledge that his dysfunction was caused by the
operation of February 1984 is without merit.
There were numerous exhibits introduced into evidence at the
trial of this matter which established that beginning in May 1984,
and continuing thereafter, plaintiff knew and reasonably should
have known that his second surgery in February 1984 was a possible
cause of his perceived sexual dysfunction and that he might have a
cause of action against defendants.

Plaintiff has completely

failed to address this evidence in his brief.
Although plaintiff alleges that he did not discover his injury
until his visit with Dr. Merrill Dayton on September 15, 1987,
there is absolutely no evidence that he became aware of any
information at this time that he did not already know in 1984 and
1985.
3.

The trial court's interpretation of U.C.A. § 78-14-4 was

based on recent cases decided by this Court, the Utah Supreme Court
and the United States District Court for the District of Utah and
was correct.

The trial court correctly held that knowledge of an

injury for purposes of the statute of limitations does not require
an expert opinion confirming malpractice.

In the absence of such

a holding, the statute would be tolled in every case until a
plaintiff not only decided to seek, but found favorable expert
medical testimony.
The trial court also correctly found that discovery of an
injury occurs when a plaintiff knows or should have known that he
might have a cause of action, and that plaintiff in this instance

-11-

discovered "the injury" and made the causal connection between his
problem and the surgery in April or May of 1984.
In his brief, plaintiff relies primarily on the case of Foil
v. Ballinger. 601 P. 2d 144 (Utah 1979) for his interpretation of
U.C.A. § 78-14-4.

However, plaintiff's reliance is misplaced due

to decisions subsequent to Foil clarifying and further interpreting
§ 78-14-4. In fact, plaintiff recognizes in his brief that Foil is
no longer followed as precedent but essentially argues that the
reasoning and analysis applied by the Utah Appellate Courts in
every case decided since Foil is flawed and incorrect.
The

evidence

presented

at

trial

also

established

that

plaintiff was fully aware of the nature, extent, severity and
permanence of his perceived injuries.

Nevertheless, the Utah

Courts have specifically addressed this issue and held that a
plaintiff need not know of the full nature, extent, severity and
permanence of an injury for the statute to begin running.

A

plaintiff need only know he is suffering a disorder to begin the
running of the statute of limitations, and need not know the extent
of his injury, the actual malady suffered, or whether the injury is
temporary or permanent.
Plaintiff's claim that he must also know that his injury was
the result of negligence is without merit.

This is not the law

with regard to § 78-14-4 and a requirement such as this would lead
to absurd results. In essence, a legal determination of negligence
would be required before the statute of limitations would run.
This is contrary to the purpose behind the enactment of § 78-14-4.

-12-

4.

The trial court's decision that the continuing treatment

doctrine was inconsistent with § 78-14-4 and not applicable in Utah
is correct.

The "continuing treatment" doctrine has been adopted

by some jurisdictions as a judicial doctrine to avoid the harsh
result of a plaintiff's claim being barred before a plaintiff knows
that there is a claim.

The basis for the doctrine is to avoid

those situations where discovery is delayed because of a continuing
doctor/patient relationship. However, states which have adopted a
discovery of injury statute of limitations for medical malpractice
actions analogous to that adopted in Utah have rejected the
continuous treatment doctrine as obsolete.
The continuing treatment doctrine serves no purpose in Utah
with the passage of § 78-14-4 and its two year discovery of injury
provision; four year statute of repose; foreign object exception;
and fraudulent concealment exception.
5.

The trial court's decision that the continuing treatment

doctrine was not applicable, even in the absence of § 78-14-4, was
correct.

There was abundant evidence establishing that plaintiff

had sufficient knowledge of his injury to commence the running of
the statute of limitations as early as May 1984. The doctrine was
not developed to toll the statute of limitations when a plaintiff
knows he has a cause of action. Further, the trial court correctly
found that plaintiff was not misled or prevented from discovering
information

about

his

alleged

injuries

as

a

result

of any

continuous course of medical treatment.
One of the primary purposes for the continuing treatment
doctrine

is for a situation where no
-13-

single

incident

in a

continuous chain of negligence can be identified as the cause of
the harm.

In such a situation, the doctrine is applied to prevent

injustice. The continuing treatment doctrine would not serve such
a purpose in this instance. Plaintiff himself contends the claims
in this case result from one specific incident, the second surgery
on February 27, 1984.
6.

The record before the court establishes that the trial

court made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law after a
careful consideration of the evidence. Plaintiff's appeal from the
trial court's decision is not grounded in fact, not warranted by
existing law, and not based on a good faith argument to extend,
modify, or reverse existing law.
appeal

simply

controvert

Rather, plaintiff's claims on

the findings of

the court.

Thus,

plaintiff's appeal is frivolous and defendant is entitled to the
benefit of U.R.C.P., Rule 33(a).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO MEET HIS BURDEN OF
MARSHALLING THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE
TRIAL
COURT'S
FINDINGS
OF
FACT
AND
DEMONSTRATING WHY THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS
ARE LACKING IN SUPPORT.
THUS, THE TRIAL
COURT'S FINDINGS SHOULD BE ACCEPTED AS VALID
AND AFFIRMED.
It is plaintiff's burden in his brief to marshall all of the
relevant evidence presented at trial which tends to support the
trial court's Findings of Fact and then demonstrate that despite
this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support
as to be against the clear weight of the evidence.
-14-

When an

appellant fails to meet this burden, the trial court's findings are
accepted as valid. Saunders v. Sharp. 793 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah App.
1990) . This Court has previously stated that this threshold burden
is neither elective nor optional.

Fitzgerald v. Critchfield. 744

P.2d 301, 304 (Utah App. 1987).

This Court has also held the

following:
This burden is a heavy one, reflective of the fact that
we do not sit to retry cases submitted on disputed facts,
(citation omitted) . Accordingly, when an appellant fails
to carry its burden of marshalling the evidence, we
refuse to consider the merits of challenges to the
findings and accept the findings as valid.
(citation
omitted).
Saunders v. Sharp, 793 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah App. 1990).
Plaintiff
marshalling

has

completely

the evidence.

failed

to meet

his burden of

The trial brief which defendants

submitted to the trial court contained 14 exhibits in support of
the position that plaintiff's claim was barred by the statute of
limitations, as well as 8 additional
excerpts.
defendants

(R. at

846-965).

introduced

exhibits of deposition

At the trial of this matter,

19 exhibits

into evidence, as well as

introducing deposition and live testimony.

(R. at 1019) .

As

reflected in the Trial Court's Decision, dated December 18, 1991,
the

court

relied

on defendant's

exhibits

testimony in reaching its' decision.

and

the proffered

(R. at 1046-1054; See

Addendum "B").
In his brief, plaintiff has failed to marshall and address the
aforementioned evidence submitted by defendants to the trial court.
Instead, he has set forth those facts and testimony which he
believes support his view of the facts and argues that there is
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evidence contradicting the trial court's Findings.

In fact# the

majority of the evidence set forth in his brief is his own
testimony, the credibility of which the trial court, and not this
court, was obligated and permitted to assess.
Because of his failure to properly marshall the evidence,
plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the trial court's Findings
are against the clear weight of the evidence.
"shown no reluctance

This Court has

to affirm when the appellant

adequately marshall the evidence".

fails to

West Valley City v. Majestic

Inv. Co. . 818 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah App. 1991) . The same result is
warranted in this instance.

Thus, the trial court's Findings of

Fact must be accepted as valid and should be affirmed.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND SHOULD BE
AFFIRMED.
As mentioned above, plaintiff has failed to carry his burden
of marshalling the evidence.

Because of this failure, the merits

of plaintiff's challenges to the trial court's Findings should not
be considered by this Court and the trial court's Findings should
be accepted as valid.

However, for argument purposes and without

intending to waive the position stated under Point I above,
defendants will address plaintiff's specific challenges to the
trial

court's

Findings

of

Fact

supporting each finding.
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and

set

forth

the

evidence

A.

Findings of Fact 5, 6 and 10,

Plaintiff's first challenge is to Findings of Fact numbered 5,
6 and 10.

These findings essentially state that plaintiff was

fully informed of the risks and benefits of his surgery prior to
undergoing

the

procedure,

including

the

fact

that

sexual

dysfunction was a risk of the procedure.
Although plaintiff denies that he was informed of the risk of
sexual dysfunction, the trial court, in the Court's Decision of
December 18, 1991, held that this denial was not credible in view
of the totality

of the testimony, including plaintiff's own

testimony that he considered and requested that his sperm be banked
prior to the surgery.

(R. at 1051) .

In particular, the trial

court held that plaintiff's articulated desire to have his sperm
banked would not have been made but for his knowledge of the risk
of sexual dysfunction. (R. at 1049).
The trial court further noted that it considered plaintiff's
demeanor and testimony, and found that his demeanor, attitude and
the content of his answers revealed him to be an intelligent,
careful man with a great attention to detail. The trial court also
recognized that plaintiff was a lawyer and understood the concept
of informed consent.

(R. at 1049) .

Findings of Fact 5, 6 and 10 are supported by the testimony
presented to the trial court from Dr. Becker.

This testimony

established that Dr. Becker informed plaintiff of the risks of the
surgery,

including

the risk of sexual dysfunction, and that

plaintiff knew of this possibility before surgery.

(R. at 1201-

1202, 1204, 1224) . Evidence was also presented to the trial court
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establishing that plaintiff had access to, and read, a pamphlet
from the Mayo clinic regarding the ileoanal anastomosis procedure.
(R. at 1341-1342).

This pamphlet stated that sexual dysfunction

was a risk of the procedure.
Plaintiff

asserts

in his brief

that

the

issue of what

plaintiff was informed of prior to trial is irrelevant.

However,

this issue was raised by plaintiff and is clearly relevant to when
plaintiff became aware that his sexual dysfunction could have been
caused by the surgery.
is

particularly

Plaintiff's knowledge prior to his surgery

relevant

in

light

of

plaintiff's

continued

representations that he had no reason to believe that his surgery
could result in sexual dysfunction problems.

Accordingly, the

trial court's findings of fact numbered 5, 6 and 10 are supported
by the evidence and should be affirmed.
B.

Findings of Fact 16 and 26.

Plaintiff also challenges Findings of Fact 16 and 26. These
two Findings will be addressed together due to there similarity and
because of the common evidence supporting them.
Finding of Fact 16 states that beginning in May 1984, and
continuing thereafter, plaintiff knew and reasonably should have
known that his second surgery in February was a possible cause of
his perceived sexual dysfunction and that he might have a cause of
action against

defendants.

Finding

of Fact

26 states that

plaintiff's action was not commenced within two years after he knew
and

reasonably

should

have

known

of

his

perceived

sexual

dysfunction and general dissatisfaction with the outcome of his
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surgeries and that he might have a claim for malpractice against
defendants.
Plaintiff's challenge to these two Findings is based on his
own testimony and his assertion that there is no evidence in the
record supporting them. However, plaintiff completely ignores the
abundant evidence presented to the trial court supporting Findings
of Fact 16 and 26.
The complaint in this matter was filed by plaintiff on
April 26, 1988.

(R. at 2-10). A request for prelitigation review,

which tolls the statute of limitations, was filed by plaintiff on
January 15, 1988.
medical malpractice
plaintiff

discovers

(R. at 3).
actions
or

The statute of limitations for

is two years

should

have

from the date the

discovered

the

injury.

Therefore, if plaintiff discovered or should have discovered his
injury prior to January 15, 1986 his case is time barred.
In his brief, plaintiff states that he denied any knowledge
that his dysfunction was caused by the operation of February 1984.
(See Brief of Appellant, P. 13). He further alleges that he did
not report his dysfunction problems to Dr. Becker because of any
belief that they were caused by the surgery.

Not only is there

abundant evidence refuting plaintiff's denials, but these denials
are particularly interesting in light of the fact that in his brief
plaintiff has not challenged the trial court's Findings of Fact 12
and 14.
Finding of Fact 14 states that since May 1984, in discussions
and correspondence with various physicians, plaintiff repeatedly
causally related his perceived sexual dysfunction to the second
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operative procedure performed in February 1984.

Further, Finding

of Fact 12 states that in May 1984 plaintiff reported his perceived
sexual dysfunction to his parents and Dr. Becker, and that he
reported to Dr. Becker that he had been told by his family doctor
that he might be impotent, secondary to his surgery.

In light of

these accepted facts, plaintiff's denial that he had any knowledge
that his dysfunction was caused by the operation of February 1984
is unacceptable.
The evidence overwhelmingly shows that plaintiff had knowledge
of his "injury" as early as May 1984. There were numerous exhibits
and abundant testimony introduced into evidence at the trial of
this matter which established that plaintiff knew and reasonably
should have known as early as 1984 that his second surgery in
February

1984 was a possible

cause of his perceived

sexual

dysfunction and that he might have a cause of action against
defendants.

Plaintiff has completely failed to address this

evidence in his brief.

The following is a list of exhibits and

evidence introduced at trial which support the trial court's
Findings of Fact 16 and 26:
Defendants Trial Exhibit-1; Plaintiff Trial Exhibit-4: In
the interim the patient now also complains of possible
impotence. This patient is a very anxious young man and
is concerned about his sexual function. . . . He states
that he is concerned about impotence because prior to his
surgery he had regular nocturnal erections and emissions.
Since his second operation he states the frequency of
these events has decreased. He was told by his family
doctor that he might be impotent secondary to his
surgery.
(Excerpts from May 29, 1984 letter from Dr.
James Becker to Dr. Richard Middleton) .
(R. at 882,
1152-1153, 1274).
Defendants Trial Exhibit-3: In August 1984, plaintiff
reports to Dr. Urry on his medical history form that his
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sexual dysfunction problems were the result of his colon
surgeries. (Deposition excerpts of Dr. Ronald L. Urry).
(R. at 943-946, 2088, 2108-2110, 2112).
Defendants Trial Exhibit-4: My basic problem is the
result of my colon surgeries. I have had three surgeries
for colitis: (1) partial removal of the colon Jan. 1984;
(2) pull-through Feb. 1984; and (3) take down in June
1984. I noticed a marked difference in my sexual arousal
after the second surgery. Diminished ability to achieve
an erection, no real orgasm, and no sperm ejaculate.
(Mr. Jones also reports that he was able to obtain an
erection easily before his surgery but not now, that he
did have erections in the morning before his surgery but
not now and that he was aware of his erections in the
night before his surgery but not now.) (Medical History
Form filled out by plaintiff, Fertility Evaluation
Clinic, Division of Urology, University of Utah Medical
Center, Dr. Ronald Urry, May 31, 1984) . (R. at 884-887,
1283-1284).
Defendants Trial Exhibit-6: As you know, the patient
complained of impotence since February. . . .
He
indicated that by late February he sensed a "deadening"
and lack of nocturnal emissions. (Excerpts from letter
from D. Corydon Hammond, Ph.D. to James M. Becker, M.D.
June 15, 1984). (R. at 889, 1523).
Defendants Trial Exhibit-7; Patient has apparently been
told that or came to the conclusion that the procedure
has not been successful. (Records from the University of
Utah Medical Center; Psychiatric consultation progress
note; Dr. Richard Segal; July 2, 1984). (R. at 893-894,
1523) .
Defendants Trial Exhibit-10: I am a thirty-three year old
male who has experienced sexual dysfunction problems
following a pull-through procedure for chronic ulcerative
colitis. . . . Specifically, I have a diminished ability
to achieve an erection and more importantly no
emission/ejaculation function.
(Excerpts from letter
from G. Kevin Jones to Dr. David Barrett, Mayo Clinic);
(This letter is not dated but is prior to January 15,
1985, based on the return letter from Dr. Barrett
thanking Mr. Jones for his recent letter with regard to
his problem with ejaculation following surgery for
colitis). (R. at 899, 1285).
Defendants Trial Exhibit-11; Since his second operation
2/84 he has had very few erections, several which were
adequate for penetration but not as strong as prior to
2/84.
(Records from University of Chicago Hospital and
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Clinic; Urology Consultation; Dr. Franklin L. Smith;
March 28, 1985). (R. at 902, 1289-1291).
Defendants Trial Exhibit-13; Kevin's main problem at this
point, as you know, is sterility. . . . He is convinced
that the problem is not psychological and was told this
by a psychiatrist in Chicago.
Another physician
(urologist) told him that he thought the "cord had been
cut". (Dr. James Becker's office records; Terri Stoker,
patient advocate for Dr. Becker, July 23, 1985) . (R. at
905-906, 1297-1299).
Defendants Trial Exhibit-15; Mr. Jones has asked that I
write you regarding my findings and recommendations
regarding his genitourinary system. . . . Since his
second rectal surgical procedure, he has decreasing
ability to get penile erection. He also has had failure
of ejaculation. . . . The sensation of orgasm also has
markedly decreased since his rectal surgery of March in
19 84. He is able to get an erection but it is not as
large or as hard as it was before surgery. . . . I had a
long discussion with him regarding his failure of seminal
emission and ejaculation and have told him that I would
not advise that he pursue any claims to do nerve repair
in this area because it is likely to make him worse and
possibly make him lose his erection mechanism totally. .
. . I have explained to him that the expected by product
of his colon surgery to save his life is the unfortunate
loss of his ejaculatory mechanism.
(Excerpts from
September 4, 1985 letter from Dr. Ned Mangelson to Dr.
Clifford Harman; this information is also found in the
Salt Lake Clinic, Department of Urology, Office Notes of
Dr. Ned Mangelson, August 29, 1985). (R. at 913, 915916, 1291-1294, 1308-1309, 1321).
Defendants Trial Exhibit-15; Orgasm: Markedly decreased
since rectal surgery of March of 1984. Impotence: No
more nocturnal erections. Is able to get erections but
not as hard or large as before surgery.
Work up &
Disposition: Discussed advisability of marrying as
desired at appropriate time and if erections insufficient
consider prosthesis. (Salt Lake Clinic, Department of
Urology, History and Physical by Dr. Ned Mangelson,
August 8, 1985). (R. at 908-911, 1291-1294).
Defendants Trial Exhibit-16; Enclosed is a letter to my
primary care physician, Dr. Harman, from a Salt Lake
urologist that describes the sexual dysfunction problems
that I have experienced since I underwent multiple
surgical procedures. . . The surgeries have left me with
a diminished ability to achieve an erection and no
ejaculation. . . . It has been his opinion (Dr. Becker's)
that the problem is psychological but I know this is not
-22-

the case. Immediately after the pull-through, I noticed
the problem and it is nearly two years since the problem
developed (March 1983 date of surgery). (Excerpts from
September 30, 1985 letter from G. Kevin Jones to Dr.
Roger Dozois, Mayo Clinic). (R. at 918, 1306-1308, 13221324) .
Plaintiff's reports to physicians and health care providers in
1984 and 1985 clearly establish that plaintiff knew and reasonably
should have known that his second surgery in February 1984 was a
possible cause of his perceived sexual dysfunction and that he
might have a cause of action against defendants.

Moreover,

plaintiff's claim that he did not discover his injury prior to 1987
is particularly inconceivable when reviewing the letters plaintiff
himself wrote. The only plausible conclusion from these letters is
that plaintiff had made the connection between his surgeries and
his symptoms in 1984.
Plaintiff's letter of September 30, 1985, to Dr. Dozois at the
Mayo Clinic, clearly states that plaintiff attributed his sexual
dysfunction problems to his surgeries.

In fact, plaintiff states

in the letter that he noticed the problem immediately after his
surgery in March of 1983 (this should be 1984) and that he knew
that the problem was not psychological.
1322-1324).

(R. at 918, 1306-1308,

In addition, plaintiff's letter to Dr. Barrett at the

Mayo Clinic also indicates that plaintiff attributed his sexual
dysfunction problems to his surgery in 1984.

(R. at 899, 1285).

Along with the numerous references from the medical records
mentioned above, there was also deposition and live testimony
presented to the trial court further establishing and supporting
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the fact that plaintiff had knowledge of his injury over two years
prior to filing his action.
In fact, plaintiff admitted in his testimony before the trial
court that he expressed the concern to Dr. Mangelson in August 1985
that his surgery had caused his sexual dysfunction problems.
at 1303-1304).
(R. at 1285).

(R.

Dr. Mangelson confirmed this in his deposition.
Plaintiff also testified in his deposition, taken

November 28, 1990, that he first became concerned about his sexual
dysfunction

problems

sometime

between

his

second

surgeries (between March 1984 and June 1984).
1731, 1864-1869).

and

third

(R. at 923-929,

He raised these concerns to his mother and to a

resident or intern at the University, who passed the information on
to Dr. Becker.

(R. at 923-929, 1731, 1864-1869).

Dr. Corydon Hammond also testified in his deposition that he
first saw plaintiff on June 11, 1984 and that plaintiff complained
at that time of not being able to obtain erections since his
surgery in February 1984.

(R. at 939-941, 1525).

Additionally,

the deposition testimony of Dr. Franklin Smith, a urologist at the
University of Chicago Hospital and Clinic, establishes that in
early 19 85 plaintiff reported sexual problems starting "after the
second operation in February 1984."

(R. at 1289-1291, 1541).

Plaintiff testified before the trial court that at the time he saw
Dr. Smith in early 1985 he was seeking an answer to the question of
whether his sexual dysfunction was caused by the surgery.

(R. at

1485-1486).
Finally,

Dr.

Clifford

Harman,

a

gastroenterologist

who

regularly treated plaintiff, testified in his deposition that
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plaintiff clearly felt that his problems were related to something
that had gone wrong with the surgery and that plaintiff had
reported this concern to him as early as December 1984.

(R. at

1914, 2010-2011, 1311-1314).
Each of the above references to medical records or testimony
would be sufficient evidence on its own to establish that plaintiff
made the connection between his surgeries and his symptoms and knew
he may have a cause of action against a health care provider as
early as May 1984. When considering the aforementioned references
in total, plaintiff's claim that he did not discover his injury
prior to September 1987 is inconceivable.

The only conceivable

interpretation from the numerous entries above is that plaintiff
was attributing his sexual dysfunction problems to his surgery, and
had come to this conclusion as early as 1984.
Although plaintiff alleges that he did not discover his injury
until his visit with Dr. Merrill Dayton on September 15, 1987,
there is absolutely no evidence that he became aware of any
information at this time that he did not already know in 1984 and
19 85. In fact, Dr. Dayton testified before the trial court that he
did not tell plaintiff that a complication from his surgery was the
most likely cause of his sexual dysfunction.

(R. at 1173).

It is clear from the abundant evidence presented to the trial
court that plaintiff knew and reasonably should have known as early
as 1984 that his second surgery in February 1984 was a possible
cause of his perceived sexual dysfunction and that he might have a
cause of action against defendants.

Since plaintiff's action was

not commenced within two years after he obtained such knowledge,
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his

claim

was

appropriately

dismissed

by

the

trial

court.

Accordingly, the trial court's Findings of Fact 16 and 26 are
adequately supported by the evidence and should be affirmed.
C.

Finding of Fact 17.

Finding of Fact 17 states that "plaintiff did not accept or
rely upon any other theories of causation suggested by defendants
or any other physicians. Specifically, plaintiff rejected and did
not rely upon any suggestion that there may be a psychological
cause of his perceived sexual dysfunction."

Plaintiff's challenge

to this finding is primarily his own testimony that he followed the
advise of Dr. Becker and sought additional treatment based on Dr.
Becker's representation that plaintiff's problem was psychological.
(See Brief of Appellant, p. 14). However, the clear and abundant
evidence presented to the trial court indicates otherwise.
To begin with, plaintiff's challenge to Finding 17 is also
interesting (as was his challenge to Findings 16 and 26 above) in
light of the fact that he has not challenged Finding of Fact 14;
which states that since May 1984, in discussions and correspondence
with various physicians, plaintiff repeatedly causally related his
perceived sexual dysfunction to the second operative procedure
performed in February 1984. Further, the evidence presented above
concerning Findings 16 and 26 clearly establishes that as early as
May 19 84 plaintiff attributed the cause of his problems to his
surgery in February 1984.

It is clear from this evidence that

plaintiff did not accept or rely upon any other theories of
causation.
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The evidence supporting Finding 17 includes a July 23, 1985
memorandum from Terri Stoker, patient advocate for Dr. Becker,
which stated

that plaintiff's main problem at the time was

sterility and that plaintiff was "convinced that the problem is not
psychological and was told this by a psychiatrist in Chicago." (R.
at 905-906, 1297-1299, 1323-1324). Further, plaintiff recorded the
very same thought in a letter that he wrote on September 30, 1985
to Dr. Roger Dozois at the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota:
Enclosed is a letter to my primary care physician, Dr.
Harman, from a Salt Lake urologist that describes the
sexual dysfunction problems that I have experienced since
I underwent multiple surgical procedures. . . The
surgeries have left me with a diminished ability to
achieve an erection and no ejaculation. . . . It has been
his opinion (Dr. Becker's) that the problem is
psychological but I know this is not the case, (emphasis
added). Immediately after the pull-through, I noticed
the problem and it is nearly two years since the problem
developed (March 1983 date of surgery)."
(R. at 918,
1306-1308, 1322-1324).
Plaintiff also testified that he found Dr. Corydon Hammond's
explanation, of a possible psychological cause for the dysfunction,
incredible and "unsatisfactory" and never believed this to be the
cause.

(R. at 1472) . Moreover, the fact that plaintiff failed to

pursue further psychological treatment despite recommendations that
he should makes it clear that he did not believe his problem to be
psychological.

(R. at 415-417, 1333).

Accordingly, Finding of

Fact 17 is clearly supported by the evidence and should be
affirmed.
D.

Findings of Fact 18 and 19.

Findings of Fact 18 and 19 state that Jones was not misled or
deceived concerning the possible causes of his perceived sexual
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dysfunction and that defendants did not fraudulently represent or
conceal any information relevant to plaintiff's treatment, recovery
or perceived sexual dysfunction.

In support of his challenge to

these findings, plaintiff states that Dr. Becker discounted any
possibility that the surgery was the cause of his dysfunction, that
defendants never told him that the surgery caused permanent sexual
dysfunction and that defendants denied any causation between the
surgery and plaintiff's problems. Even if the trial court assumed
these assertions to be true, plaintiff does not present any
evidence of misrepresentation, deception or fraudulent concealment
on the part of defendants.
Although plaintiff argues that he was never told that the
surgery caused permanent sexual dysfunction and that defendants
denied any causation between the surgery and plaintiff's problems,
he states later in his brief that "the record demonstrates that
Becker really didn't know whether Jones' sexual dysfunctions were
in any way related to the surgery".

(See Brief of Appellant, p.

33) . He also notes that Dr. Becker is still uncertain of the cause
of plaintiff's problems, was not certain if plaintiff had a sexual
dysfunction problem at all, and also characterized plaintiff's
problems as "ill-defined".

(See Brief of Appellant, p. 25, 33).

It is incongruous for plaintiff to claim on the one hand that he
was misled by defendants as to the cause of his problems and then
later admit that defendants were, and still are, uncertain as to
what that cause is.
As the trial court appropriately noted, plaintiff presented no
evidence at trial that he was ever misled or deceived about the
-28-

cause of his problems.

(R. at 1722).

In fact, the abundant

evidence presented clearly establishes that plaintiff believed that
his problems were caused by his surgery. As previously noted, the
trial court record is replete with evidence that since May 1984, in
discussions and correspondence with various physicians, plaintiff
repeatedly causally related his perceived sexual dysfunction to his
second surgery in February 1984.
Moreover, plaintiff admits in his own deposition that Dr.
Becker referred him to Dr. Hammond, a psychologist/sex therapist,
and Dr. Middleton, a urologist, for the express purpose of helping
him with his complaints of urological and sexual problems.
953-957, 1731, 1870-1873).

(R. at

Plaintiff had his first visit to Dr.

Hammond on June 11, 1984, and his first visit to Dr. Middleton on
May 31, 1984.

In addition, Dr. Becker referred plaintiff to Dr.

Joel Bauer, a colorectal surgeon in New York.

Plaintiff also

admits in his deposition that the purpose of this referral was
because Dr. Bauer specialized in working with sexual dysfunction
problems.

(R. at 959-961, 965, 2188, 2225-2226).

If Dr. Becker were trying to mislead plaintiff as to the cause
of his alleged problems, he certainly would not be referring him to
specialists to help him with his complaints. Accordingly, Findings
of Fact 18 and 19 are supported by the evidence and should be
affirmed.
E.

Finding of Fact 20.

Finding of Fact 20 states that during 1984 and 1985 plaintiff
considered suing defendants for medical malpractice based on his
perceived sexual dysfunction and general dissatisfaction with the
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outcome of his surgeries.

This finding is supported by the

testimony of Terri Stoker and her memorandum of July 23, 1985,
which she prepared while working as a patient advocate for Dr.
Becker.

(R. at 905-906, 1319-1320, 1552, 1580-1582).

In her

memorandum and testimony she states that plaintiff told her that he
"contemplated suing" (defendants) repeatedly and that plaintiff's
threats of a lawsuit were made as early as 1985.
1552, 1580-1582).

(R. at 905-906,

Accordingly, Finding 20 is supported by the

evidence and should be affirmed.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURTS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE
CORRECT.
THUS, PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM IS TIME
BARRED AND WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED BY THE TRIAL
COURT.
A.
correct.

The trial court's interpretation of U.C.A. § 78-14-4 was

1.
A plaintiff need not be aware of the full nature,
extent and permanence of his injuries.
The statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions in
Utah is contained in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah
Code Annotated § 78-14-4, which provides in pertinent part:
No malpractice action against a health care provider may
be brought unless it is commenced within two years after
the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of
reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury,
whichever first occurs, . . . .
The critical question concerning the interpretation of § 78-14-4,
and the issue addressed in the majority of the cases, is what the
phrase "discovery of injury" means. This issue was also addressed
by the trial court in this instance.
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The trial court's interpretation of U.C.A. § 78-14-4 in this
instance, and of the phrase "discovery of injury", was based on
recent case precedent from this court.

The trial court noted in

its Decision that it was clear from this Court's opinion in
Deschamps v. Pulley. 784 P.2d 471 (Utah App. 1989) that knowledge
of an

injury does not

malpractice.

require an expert

(R. at 1047).

opinion confirming

The trial court further found that

discovery of an injury occurs when a plaintiff knows or should have
known that he might have a cause of action, and that plaintiff
discovered "the injury" and made the causal connection between his
problem and the surgery in April or May of 1984.

(R. at 1048).

Utah Courts, including this Court in Floyd v. Western Surgical
Associates, 773 P.2d 401 (Utah App. 1989), have affirmed a trial
court's grant of summary judgment in situations with evidence far
less compelling than this instance.

In Floyd, the trial court

based its decision that plaintiff's case was time barred almost
solely on the plaintiff's deposition testimony. In his deposition,
plaintiff stated that he had informed one of his doctors over two
years prior to his lawsuit that his problems were probably caused
by surgery he received from his treating doctor (the defendant).
Based on plaintiff's testimony, the trial court granted summary
judgment for the defendant.

This Court affirmed.

In Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982), the Supreme
Court upheld the trial court's grant of summary judgment based on
a single affidavit. In Reiser, the evidence that the case was time
barred consisted primarily of a single affidavit from plaintiff's
husband in which he asserted a belief that his wife's disorders
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were temporary and that he did not become aware of any permanent
damage until later.
In his brief, plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred in
its

interpretation

and

application

of

U.C.A.

§

78-14-4.

Specifically, plaintiff alleges that the trial court improperly
applied the requirements set forth in Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d
144 (Utah 1979).

(See Brief of Appellant, p. 17).

Plaintiff

asserts that one of the requirements under Foil is that a plaintiff
understand the full nature, extent, severity and permanency of his
condition.

However, as this Court is aware, plaintiff's reliance

on Foil is misplaced due to the decisions subsequent to Foil
clarifying and further interpreting § 78-14-4.
In Foil, the plaintiff underwent surgery for back problems.
Following surgery, the plaintiff was in a pain clinic and received
a subarachnoid block, a block of anesthetic into the subarachnoid
space in the spinal column. She then suffered symptoms of bladder
and rectal problems which led to a total colectomy.

Summary

judgment was granted by the trial court based on the running of the
statute of limitations.
On appeal, the plaintiff claimed that she had no knowledge of
any connection between the subarachnoid block and the symptoms of
bladder and rectal dysfunction.

There was no evidence to the

contrary in that case and the Supreme Court reversed. The Court's
holding in Foil is consistent with the later cases but the decision
produced

some

unfortunate

language

addressed.
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which

was

subsequently

Foil is one of the first cases addressing the meaning of the
phrase "discovery of injury".

Although Foil was not explicitly

overruled, subsequent decisions by this Court and the Utah Supreme
Court have modified and clarified the holding in Foil.

Foil held

that an injury is discovered, and the statute begins to run, "when
an injured person knows or should know that he has suffered a legal
injury."
court.

Id. at 147.

A two prong test was enunciated by the

A legal injury is discovered when a plaintiff knows or

should have known (1) that he or she has sustained an injury, and
(2) that the injury was caused by negligence. However, due to the
absurd

results

that

would

have

resulted

from

the

literal

application of this standard, the Utah Courts quickly began to
broaden the standard. Essentially, if the language from Foil would
have been adhered to, the statute of limitations for medical
malpractice actions would not begin to run until there had been a
legal determination of negligence.
Soon after Foil, in Hove v. McMaster, 621 P.2d 694 (Utah
1980) , the Supreme Court had an opportunity to look at the same
issue again.

Hove was decided approximately one year after Foil

and both opinions were written by Justice Stewart.

Hove involved

a case against a dentist who had given the plaintiff two injections
for a filling.

Following the injections, the plaintiff suffered

some pain and tingling which she claimed she did not know were
caused by the injections.

She consulted the defendant about her

problems one year after the treatment and was referred to a
neurologist.
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The neurologist informed plaintiff that her problems could be
caused by one of four things, including the fact that it may be a
complication from the dental injections given by the defendant.
Over the next several years, the plaintiff visited several doctors
due to her recurring pain and tingling.

In each case she told the

doctors about the dental injections but none of the doctors
specifically attributed her problems to the injections.

Finally,

she went to a physician who told her that her problems were the
result of the dental injections given by the defendant dentist.
The statute of limitations was raised as a defense and a
bifurcated trial like that held in this instance was held to
address that issue.

The trial court held that plaintiff's action

was barred by the statute of limitations and the Supreme Court
affirmed.

In upholding the trial court's decision, the Supreme

Court held that the discovery of injury test was satisfied if the
plaintiff knew or should have known "that the injury she suffered
may have been caused by negligence on the part of the defendant."
Id. at 69 7.

Thus, under Hove, a plaintiff need only know of the

possibility of a causal connection between her injury and the
alleged negligent act.
Hove was relied upon by this Court in its recent decision in
Deschamps v. Pulley, 784 P.2d 471 (Utah App. 1989) . In Peschamps,
this Court was faced with the same argument made to the Supreme
Court in Hove; that a plaintiff does not know of her legal injury
until

she

receives

an

expert

medical

opinion

confirming

malpractice. Plaintiff essentially makes the same argument in this
instance. This Court rejected that argument as being inconsistent
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with the purpose of the statute of limitations statutory scheme;
noting that if plaintiff's argument were accepted the statute would
be tolled in every case until a plaintiff not only decided to seek,
but found favorable expert testimony.

Jd. at 475.

This Court further discussed the interpretation of "discovery
of injury" in Floyd v. Western Surgical Associates, 773 P.2d 401
(Utah App. 1989).

In Floyd, the plaintiff consulted a Dr. Wilcox

in November of 1981 for severe heartburn. Dr. Wilcox referred the
plaintiff to a Dr. Lindem for hiatal hernia surgery.
was done by Dr. Lindem on December 9, 1981.

The surgery

However, Dr. Lindem

performed two other surgical procedures of which the plaintiff was
unaware of at that time.
After experiencing stomach pains over the next several months,
the plaintiff consulted Dr. Lindem who at that time told him of the
additional surgeries he had performed.

This was in March or April

of 1982. The plaintiff testified in his deposition that this was
the first time he learned of the additional surgeries and that he
knew at this time that these additional surgeries were the cause of
his upset stomach and other problems. The plaintiff also testified
that, in September of 1982, he informed Dr. Wilcox that Dr. Lindem
had performed additional surgeries and that his problems were
probably caused by the surgery.
The complaint was filed in March of 1986. In July of 1987 the
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants,
holding that the claim was time barred.
stating the following reasoning:
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This Court affirmed,

In this case, unlike Foil. Floyd's deposition testimony
establishes that Floyd was aware in September of 1982
that Dr. Lindem performed surgery in addition to the
hiatal hernia surgery and that his symptoms were caused
by the additional surgery. In contrast to Foil. Floyd
had made the connection between the surgery and his
symptoms, according to his clear deposition testimony.
Therefore, by September 1982, at the latest, Floyd
discovered or should have discovered the injury and that
the additional surgical procedures caused his injury.
Id. at 404.
Finally, in Harcrett v. Limbercr. 598 F.Supp. 152 (D.Utah 1984) ,
Judge Winder provided a succinct and logical analysis of the test
to be applied in determining when the statute of limitations begins
to run in medical malpractice cases:
Under Foil. and its progeny, a legal determination of
negligence is not necessary to start the statute of
limitations. Rather, the crucial question was whether
the plaintiff was aware of the facts that would lead a
reasonable person to conclude that he may have a cause of
action against the health care provider.
See, e.g..
Reiser v. Lohner. 641 P.2d 93, 99 (Utah 1982); Hove v.
McMaster, 621 P.2d 694, 696 (Utah 1980); Foil, 601 P.2d
at 148. Those facts include the existence of an injury,
its cause and the possibility of negligence.
Id. at 155.
Based on the above mentioned decisions rendered subsequent to Foil.
which clarified the interpretation of U.C.A. § 78-14-4, plaintiff's
reliance in his brief on Foil is misplaced.
In fact, plaintiff recognizes in his brief that Foil is no
longer followed as precedent and notes that "subsequent Appellate
Court decisions . . . have ignored the Supreme Court's instruction
(in Foil) and have held

that the requisite

"knowledge" the

plaintiff must have to satisfy the Foil test is mere awareness of
a temporary disorder, Reiser v. Lohner. 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982);
Duerden v. Utah Valley Hospital. 663 F.Supp. 781 (D.Utah 1987); or
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the mere belief that a patient's symptoms were unavoidable side
effects of treatment, Floyd v. Western Surgical Associates, 773
P.2d 401 (Utah App. 1989); Deschamps v. Pulley. 784 P.2d 471 (Utah
App. 1989)."

See Brief at 19.

Plaintiff further adds that the

above cited cases "have misapplied the Foil "knowledge of injury"
test . . . ."

(See Brief of Appellant, p. 19). Finally, plaintiff

later states in his brief that "the District Court's decision
erroneously interpreted Foil to mean that the statute runs from two
years when a plaintiff knew or should have known that he had
suffered an injury which may have been caused by Defendants." (See
Brief of Appellant, p. 43).
In making the above statements, plaintiff is asserting that
the reasoning and analysis applied in every case decided since Foil
is flawed and incorrect.
court's

Additionally, by criticizing the trial

interpretation of

criticizing

§ 78-14-4 plaintiff

is in essence

those decisions relied on by the trial court in

reaching its decision. As mentioned above, the trial court relied
upon recent decisions by this Court and other Utah courts in its
interpretation of § 78-14-4.

Instead of addressing those cases

decided subsequent to Foil, plaintiff relies on language from Foil
which does not represent an accurate interpretation of § 78-14-4.
For example, plaintiff argues that the knowledge of injury
prong enunciated in Foil is not met until a plaintiff knows the
full nature, extent, severity and permanence of the injury.
Plaintiff further asserts that he was not aware of the full nature,
extent, severity and permanence of his injury until he was told so
by Dr. Dayton in September 19 87.
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However, the record before the

trial court establishes that plaintiff was reporting to medical
providers as early as April or May of 1984 that he attributed his
sexual problems to his second surgery in February 1984. Moreover,
Dr. Dayton testified before the trial court that he did not tell
plaintiff that a complication from his surgery was the most likely
cause of his sexual dysfunction.

(R. at 1173).

Plaintiff's argument also fails because the evidence presented
at trial clearly established that plaintiff was fully aware of the
nature, extent, severity and permanence of his perceived injuries.
This evidence was previously addressed above when discussing the
trial court's Findings of Fact. Additionally, this Court, the Utah
Supreme Court and the United States District Court for the District
of Utah have specifically addressed this issue and held that a
plaintiff need not know the full nature, extent, severity and
permanence of an injury for the statute of limitations to begin
running.
In Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982) , the Utah Supreme
Court addressed the very argument plaintiff makes in his brief;
that he believed his injuries were temporary and was not aware of
their permanent nature until 1987. The Supreme Court rejected the
argument that the statute of limitations does not run because of a
belief that the injury was temporary.

In doing so, the Court

stated:
Mr. Reiser filed an affidavit wherein he asserted a
belief that his wife's disorders were temporary and that
he did not become aware of any permanent damage until
June, 1972. Such declaration of his belief was not
sufficient to raise an issue of fact. Furthermore, the
very acknowledgment that his wife was suffering disorders
as a result of the incident (whether temporary or
-38-

permanent) would show that plaintiffs should have known
that they had suffered legal injury at the time of the
cardiac arrest.
Id. at 100.
This very same issue was also addressed by the Federal
District Court in Duerden v. Utah Valley Hospital. 663 F.Supp. 781
(D.Utah 1987), where Judge Greene interpreted Utah law and relied
on the Reiser case. In Duerden, plaintiff argued that his lack of
knowledge that the injury was permanent and his belief in its
temporary nature tolled the statute of limitations.

Judge Greene

rejected this argument and held that a plaintiff need only know he
is suffering a disorder to begin the running of the statute of
limitations.

Id. at 784 (emphasis added).

The Court added the

following:
Under Reiser, the threshold knowledge the injured party
must have to satisfy the first prong of the Foil test is
knowledge that she is suffering a "disorder." Under this
view, the statute begins to run upon acquisition of such
knowledge, whether or not the injured party is aware of
the extent of her injury, the actual malady suffered, or
the permanent nature of her symptoms.
Id. at 784.
Thus, knowledge of a disorder, whether temporary or permanent, is
sufficient

to

start

the

statute

of

limitations

in medical

malpractice actions.
Finally, this Court addressed a similar argument in Deschamps
v. Pulley, 784 P.2d 471 (Utah App. 1989) . In Deschamps, this Court
addressed the daughter's argument that the she did not know of her
mother's legal injury because she was led to believe her mother's
death was the result of unavoidable side effects.
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Plaintiff has similarly argued in this instance that, despite
his knowledge of his alleged injury and its cause, he did not
discover a legal injury for purposes of the statute of limitations
because he was misled by Dr. Becker as to the cause of his injury.
This argument was previously addressed above when responding to
plaintiff's challenge to Findings of Fact 18 and 19. However, even
if plaintiff's allegations that he was misled were true, although
there

is absolutely

no evidence

supporting

them, this Court

rejected such an argument in Peschamps:
This court recently upheld the granting of summary
judgment under section 78-14-4, finding that the
plaintiff as a matter of law knew that his injuries were
caused by medical malpractice more than two years before
he filed his complaint.
Floyd v. Western Surgical
Assocs. , Inc. , 773 P.2d 401, 405 (UtahCt.App. 1989). We
rejected the plaintiff's argument that he did not know of
his legal injury because he was led to believe his
symptoms were unavoidable side effects of his treatment.
Id. at 403. Again, this court previously has rejected
the position urged by Ms. Deschamps that she did not know
of her mother's legal injury because she was led to
believe her mother's death was the result of unavoidable
side effects.
Id. at 474.
[Plaintiff also relies on the case of Christiansen v. Rees, 20 Utah
2d 199, 436 P.2d 435 (Utah 1968), for the proposition that the
plaintiff must know of the permanence of the injury. However, this
case arose under the old four year statute of limitations (§ 78-1225(2)) and involved leaving a surgical needle in the plaintiff's
body.

Thus, Christiansen has no application to the facts in this

instance.]
Despite

the utter lack of supporting

evidence, and the

substantial evidence to the contrary, plaintiff continues to assert
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throughout his brief that although he was generally aware of a
medical problem, he was not aware of the nature and extent of his
injuries. He further asserts that he relied on the representations
by defendants that his problem was temporary and was not caused by
the surgery. However, these assertions are absurd in light of the
evidence presented to the trial court that as early as May 1984
plaintiff

was attributing

the cause of his perceived sexual

dysfunction to his surgery in February 1984.
Finally, plaintiff asserts in a footnote that he should not be
held to have knowledge of his injury because the trial court and
defendants doctors cannot agree on whether plaintiff actually
suffered an injury.

This argument fails for several reasons.

First, it is plaintiff's perception of his injuries that is
evaluated

for

purposes

of

the

running

of

the

limitations, not the trial court's or defendants.

statute

of

As discussed,

the evidence is clear that plaintiff believed he suffered an
injury. Second, the question of whether plaintiff has suffered an
injury goes to the merits of plaintiff's malpractice claim and not
to the statute of limitations issue.
2.
A plaintiff need not have knowledge that his injuries are
the result of negligence.
Plaintiff also argues in his brief that the statute of
limitations does not run until a plaintiff has knowledge of the
cause of his injury and knows that the injury was the result of
improper treatment.

The first question of whether plaintiff knew

of the cause of his alleged sexual dysfunction has been fully
addressed above.

As noted, the evidence is clear that plaintiff
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was attributing the cause of his problems to his second surgery in
February 19 84 and that he became aware of this knowledge no later
than May 1984.
Plaintiff's claim that he must also know that his injury was
the result of negligence is without merit. As reviewed above, this
is not the law with regard to § 78-14-4.

For obvious reasons, a

requirement such as this would lead to absurd results. In essence,
an admission or a legal determination of negligence would be
required before the statute of limitations would run.

This is

certainly contrary to the purpose behind the enactment of § 78-144.

In Deschamps, this Court stated the following when faced with

the argument that a plaintiff does not know of her legal injury
until

she

receives

an

expert

medical

opinion

confirming

malpractice:
If we accepted Ms. Deschamps's position that she could
not know of her legal injury until she received an expert
medical opinion confirming malpractice, the statute would
be tolled in every case until a plaintiff not only
decided to seek, but found favorable expert medical
testimony. We do not believe this result is consistent
with the purpose of the statutory scheme.
Id. at 475.
The remainder of plaintiff's argument with regard to this
issue is essentially the same as that made previously in his brief;
that he was told the surgery was not the cause of his problems,
that he relied on defendants, and that he did not have knowledge of
his injury until his visit with Dr. Dayton on September 15, 1987.
Since these allegations have been previously addressed above,
defendants will not address them further.

However, it should be

noted that plaintiff's version of what Dr. Dayton told him is not
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supported by Dr. Dayton's testimony.

Dr. Dayton testified before

the trial court that he did not tell plaintiff that a complication
from

his

surgery

dysfunction.

was

the most

(R. at 1173).

likely

cause

of

his

sexual

It is clear that plaintiff learned

nothing from his visit with Dr. Dayton that he did not already
know.
B.
The trial court's decision that the continuing treatment
doctrine was inconsistent with § 78-14-4 and not applicable in Utah
was correct.
Plaintiff's next argument in his brief is that the trial court
erred in finding, as a matter of law, that the

"continuing

treatment"

statute

doctrine

was

inconsistent

with

the

of

limitations passed by the legislature and was not applicable since
the passage of this section

(§ 78-14-4).

The trial court's

decision on this issue was based on the trial briefs presented by
the parties and the arguments of counsel at trial.

It should be

noted that plaintiff cited no Utah authority in his trial brief in
support of his argument.

(R. 531, 554-556, 1720).

The "continuing treatment" doctrine has been adopted by some
jurisdictions as a judicial doctrine to avoid the harsh result of
a plaintiff's claim being barred before a plaintiff knows that
there is a claim.

The basis for the doctrine is to avoid those

situations where discovery is delayed because of a continuing
doctor/patient relationship. However, states which have adopted a
discovery of injury statute of limitations for medical malpractice
actions analogous to that adopted in Utah have rejected the
continuous treatment doctrine as obsolete. The Washington Supreme

-43-

Court came to such a conclusion in Bixler v. Bowman, 614 P.2d 1290
(Wash. 1980);
Likewise, the 1971 statute substantially
modified the continuing course of treatment
rule formulated in Samuelson v. Freeman.
Supra. Under Samuelson, the cause of action
would not accrue until, when there was a
continuous and substantially uninterrupted
course of treatment for a particular illness,
the treatment for the particular illness or
condition had been terminated.
The 1971
statute restricts the commencement of the
action to within "three years from the date of
the alleged wrongful act". The concept of the
termination of a "continuing course of
treatment"
has
been
succeeded
by
the
designation of a "date of the alleged wrongful
act".
Id. at 1292.
An opinion from the Kansas Supreme Court supports the same
conclusion. In discussing the "continuous treatment" doctrine and
the "physician-patient relationship" doctrine, the Kansas Supreme
Court stated the following:
An examination of the cases in which either of
the two doctrines was adopted reveals that
generally the treatment was a judicial effort
to soften the harshness of the statutory
accrual rule existing in the particular
jurisdiction at the time.
The Kansas
Legislature did not see fit to mention either
"physician-patient
relationship"
or
"continuous treatment" as an element in
measuring the time in which a cause of action
accrues.
We are not inclined to do so by
judicially legislating.
Hecht v. First National Bank & Trust Company, 490 P.2d 649, 656,
657 (Kansas 1971).
Although plaintiff relies on the case of Hundley v. St.
Francis Hospital, 327 P.2d 131 (Cal. App. 1958) in support of his
argument, this case addresses the physician/patient relationship
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doctrine.

This doctrine is a minority position which holds that

the statute of limitations is tolled while the physician/patient
relationship continues.

Further, this doctrine was not argued by

plaintiff before the trial

court and

is different

from the

continuing treatment doctrine.
Defendants assert, and the trial court agreed, that the
continuing treatment doctrine serves no purpose and is overruled in
Utah by the legislatures passage of § 78-14-4.

Section 78-14-4

provides (1) a two year discovery of injury provision; (2) a four
year statute of repose; (3) a foreign object exception; and (4) a
fraudulent concealment exception.
In fact, the fraudulent concealment exception is very similar
to the continuing treatment doctrine.

One of the purposes of the

continuing treatment doctrine was to prevent the abuse of the
physician/patient
wrongful act.

relationship by the physician to conceal a
Thus,

if the trial court had held that the

continuing treatment doctrine was applicable in this instance, it
would have put an additional exception into § 78-14-4 not provided
for by the legislature.
C.
The trial court's decision that the continuing treatment
doctrine was not applicable, even in the absence of § 78-14-4. was
correct.
Although the trial court found that the continuing treatment
doctrine was not applicable in Utah since the passage of § 78-14-4,
the court also held, as a matter of law, that the doctrine would
not apply to this case even in the absence of § 78-14-4.

This

decision was based on the trial court's factual findings that
plaintiff possessed all of the knowledge and information pertaining
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to his alleged injury and possible causes during the time he was
being treated by defendants which he possessed at the time he
commenced this action and he was not misled or prevented from
obtaining any information as a result of any continuing treatment,
(R. at 1088) . Plaintiff argues that this conclusion of law was in
error.
Even if the continuing treatment doctrine were recognized in
Utah, it would not apply to the facts of this case. To begin with,
there was abundant

evidence

establishing

that

plaintiff

had

sufficient knowledge of his injury to commence the running of the
statute of limitations as early as May 1984. The doctrine was not
developed to toll the statute of limitations when a plaintiff knows
he has a cause of action. Further, as discussed above, there is no
evidence that plaintiff was misled or prevented from discovering
information

about

his

alleged

injuries

as

a

result

of

any

continuous course of medical treatment.
One of the primary purposes for the continuing treatment
doctrine

is

for a situation where no

single

incident

in a

continuous chain of negligence can be identified as the cause of
the harm.

In such a situation, the doctrine is applied to prevent

injustice. The continuing treatment doctrine would not serve such
a purpose in this instance.

As plaintiff himself admits, the

claims in this case clearly result from one specific incident, the
second surgery on February 27, 1984. Plaintiff's attempt to invoke
the doctrine in this instance was simply an effort to avoid
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his known failure to comply with the statute of limitations. The
trial court's decision that the doctrine did not apply to the facts
in this instance was correct.
POINT IV
PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL IS FRIVOLOUS.
Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides in
part:
If the court determines that a motion made or appeal
taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay,
it shall award just damages, . . .
Rule 33 further defines a frivolous appeal as "not grounded in
fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith
argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law."

Plaintiff's

brief in this instance meets the above definition of frivolous.
This Court has held appeals to be frivolous in several recent
decisions when faced with arguments similar to that presented by
plaintiff in this instance. In O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306 (Utah
App. 1987), this Court held the defendant's appeal to be frivolous
and stated the following:
The record further shows the trial judge carefully
fashioning relief after a fair opportunity for hearing.
Defendant's claims on appeal simply controvert the
findings of the court. The claims are not only without
merit but are without basis in law or fact. Plaintiff is
entitled to the benefit of Rule 33(a).
Id. at 310.
Further, in another situation similar to this instance, Eames
v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Utah App. 1987), this Court found the
defendant's appeal to be frivolous and noted the following:
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The record shows the trial judge making Findings of Fact,
dividing the property, and awarding support after a
careful consideration of all the evidence. Defendant
ignores this.
Id. at 397-398.
This Court in Eames further emphasized the defendant's refusal to
acknowledge and accept the uncontroverted evidence presented to the
trial court as a factor in its decision to find defendant's appeal
frivolous.
As discussed at length above, plaintiff in this instance has
completely

ignored

and

refused

to accept

the

uncontradicted

evidence presented to the trial court. The record establishes that
the trial court made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
after a careful

consideration

of the evidence.

Instead of

addressing this evidence, plaintiff simply controverts the trial
court's findings.

In light of the clear and abundant evidence

presented at trial, plaintiff's challenges to the trial court's
Findings of Fact are without basis in fact and are frivolous.
Additionally, plaintiff's challenge to the trial court's
Conclusions of Law, specifically the trial court's interpretation
of § 78-14-4, is not warranted by existing law and is not based on
a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law.
Plaintiff essentially admits this in his brief when he notes that
subsequent appellate court decisions have not followed and have
misapplied Foil, the case he relies on to support his argument.
(See Brief of Appellant, p. 19). The trial court's interpretation
of § 78-14-4 was based on existing case precedent from Utah
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Appellate Courts that have interpreted § 78-14-4.
1048).

(R. at 1047-

Thus, plaintiff's appeal is frivolous.
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing arguments and authorities, the trial
court's decision dismissing plaintiff's action because it was not
commenced within the time required by the applicable statute of
limitations, U.C.A § 78-14-4, should be affirmed.

The trial

court's Findings of Fact were supported by the evidence and it's
Conclusions of Law were correct.

Beginning in May 1984 and

continuing thereafter, plaintiff knew and reasonably should have
known that his second surgery in February 1984 was a possible cause
of his perceived sexual dysfunction and that he might have a cause
of action against defendants. Plaintiff's claim was not commenced
until January 15, 1988.

Thus, plaintiff's claim was time barred

pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-14-4.

DATED this ddTV day of f&fT^J6^

, 1992.
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ADDENDUM

Tab A

78-14-4

JUDICIAL CODE

(31) "Tort" means any legal wrong, breach of
duty, or negligent or unlawful act or omission
proximately causing injury or damage to another.
1992
78-14-4. Statute of limitations — Exceptions —
Application.
(1) No malpractice action against a health care
provider may be brought unless it is commenced
within two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence
should have discovered the injury, whichever first occurs, but not to exceed four years after the date of the
alleged act, omission, neglect or occurrence, except
that:
(a) In an action where the allegation against
the health care provider is that a foreign object
has been wrongfully left within a patient's body,
the claim shall be barred unless commenced
within one year after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence
should have discovered, the existence of the foreign object wrongfully left in the patient's body,
whichever first occurs; and
(b) In an action where it is alleged that a patient has been prevented from discovering misconduct on the part of a health care provider because that health care provider has affirmatively
acted to fraudulently conceal the alleged misconduct, the claim shall be barred unless commenced
within one year after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the fraudulent
concealment, whichever first occurs.
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply to all
persons, regardless of minority or other legal disability under Section 78-12-36 or any other provision of
the law, and shall apply retroactively to all persons,
partnerships, associations and corporations and to all
health care providers and to all malpractice actions
against health care providers based upon alleged personal injuries which occurred prior to the effective
date of this act; provided, however, that any action
which under former law could have been commenced
after the effective date of this act may be commenced
only within the unelapsed portion of time allowed
under former law; but any action which under former
law could have been commenced more than four years
after the effective date of this act may be commenced
only within four years after the effective date of this
act.

1979

78-14-4.5. Amount of award reduced by
amounts of collateral sources available to plaintiff — No reduction where
subrogation right exists — Collateral
sources defined — Procedure to preserve subrogation rights — Evidence
admissible — Exceptions.
(1) In all malpractice actions against health care
providers as defined in Section 78-14-3 in which damages are awarded to compensate the plaintiff for
losses sustained, the court shall reduce the amount of
such award by the total of all amounts paid to the
plaintiff from all collateral sources which are available to him; however, there shall be no reduction for
collateral sources for which a subrogation right exists
as provided in this section nor shall there be a reduction for any collateral payment not included in the
award of damages. Upon a finding of liability and an
awarding of damages by the trier of fact, the court
shall receive evidence concerning the total amounts
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of collateral sources which have been paid to or f
the benefit of the plaintiff or are otherwise availau?r
to him. The court shall also take testimony of a *
amount which has been paid, contributed, or forfeitJi
by, or on behalf of the plaintiff or members of h
immediate family to secure his right to any collater 1
source benefit which he is receiving as a result of K"
injury, and shall offset any reduction in the award b
such amounts. No evidence shall be received and no
reduction made with respect to future collateral
source benefits except as specified in Subsection (41
(2) For purposes of this section "collateral source"
means payments made to or for the benefit of the
plaintiff for:
(a) medical expenses and disability payments
payable under the United States Social Security
Act, any federal, state, or local income disability
act, or any other public program, except the fed',
eral programs which are required by law to seek
subrogation;
(b) any health, sickness, or income disability
insurance, automobile accident insurance that
provides health benefits or income disability coverage, and any other similar insurance benefits,
except life insurance benefits available to the
plaintiff, whether purchased by the plaintiff or
provided by others;
(c) any contract or agreement of any person,
group, organization, partnership, or corporation
to provide, pay for, or reimburse the costs of hospital, medical, dental, or other health care services, except benefits received as gifts, contributions, or assistance made gratuitously; and
(d) any contractual or voluntary wage continuation plan provided by employers or any other
system intended to provide wages during a period
of disability.
(3) To preserve subrogation rights for amounts
paid or received prior to settlement or judgment, a
provider of collateral sources shall serve at least 30
days before settlement or trial of the action a written
notice upon each health care provider against whom
the malpractice action has been asserted. The written
notice shall state the name and address of the provider of collateral sources, the amount of collateral
sources paid, the names and addresses of all persons
who received payment, and the items and purposes
for which payment has been made.
(4) Evidence is admissible of government programs
that provide payments or benefits available in the
future to or for the benefit of the plaintiff to the extent available irrespective of the recipient's ability to
pay. Evidence of the likelihood or unlikelihood that
such programs, payments, or benefits will be available in the future is also admissible. The trier of fact
may consider such evidence in determining the
amount of damages awarded to a plaintiff for future
expenses.
(5) No provider of collateral sources is entitled to
recover the amounts of such benefits from a health
care provider, the plaintiff, or any other person or
entity as reimbursement for collateral source payments made prior to settlement or judgment, including any payments made under Title 26, Chapter 19,
except to the extent that subrogation rights to
amounts paid prior to settlement or judgment are
preserved as provided in this section. All policies of
insurance providing benefits affected by this section
are construed in accordance with this section.
1992
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN » ND FOR SAI .T I ft KE COT 1ETY

G. KEVIN JONES,

('f , [ M I

' .: '

vs.

C-B8-27 J6

:

THE STATE OF UTAH; THE
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH; THE
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH HOSPITAL
AND MEDICAL CENTER; and
JAMES M, BECKER, M.D.,

:
:
:

Defendants.

The

COURT7- DECISION

:

PL a i i, + i f f ,

ST.?' TE 01 I JTAH ""'

:

above-entitled

matter

came

before

the

Tourt

foi

bifurcated trial commenr: \ TVI IMI •: ••'».- e:
of

whether

the

statute

ol

1 imitations

A3u

: ,;i

plaintiff's cause of action against the defendants.
The
adduced,

Court

hav

the evidence

:.s*cj£.i*
received,

arguments

-;:

.

. - -.,

course:

.s

v

^: 'he

applicable law has reached this decision.
The

Coil] : t

_ ;*.-• ;ited

thai

plaintiff, Kevin Jones, knev er rhoi.id lu:ve known that h«-.

he
i.:

sustained an injury and the causation of the same, on oi aouut
May

001Q46

JONES V. STATE OF UTAH

COURT'S DECISION

PAGE TWO

Exhibit P-4, a letter dated May 29, 1984, from Dr. Becker
to Dr. Middleton clearly indicates that Mr. Jones had discussed
his sexual dysfunction with Dr. Becker prior to the date of the
letter.

Further, this letter

indicates defendant had been

"told by his family doctor that he might be impotent, secondary
to his surgery."
There
plaintiff

(line 24 of Exhibit 4 ) .

is other evidence that supports the
discovered

"the

injury"

and

made

finding that
the

causal

connection between the problem and the surgery in April or May
of 1984.

The Court finds there has been no showing of any

fraudulent concealment of plaintiff's injury by defendants or
anyone else.
Therefore, plaintiff had two years from May of 1984, the
point of discovery, in which to file an Intent to Commence
Legal Action.
The Court finds the evidence is uncontroverted that the
plaintiff's Notice of Intent to Commence Action was not filed
until December of 1987.
It is clear from a reading of Deschamps v. Pulley, 784 P.2d
471 (Utah App. 1989) , that a medical malpractice claim must be
filed within the statute of limitations period and that the
fact that a plaintiff's physicians do not render an expert
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" T^T

opinion

supportive

discouraged
file

a

'"'F "TAH

.,"'

~*

su

PAGE T H R E E

r •" oracticr

-

timely

•. .

v :

..'a^<i -...c

claim.

T!;e

Court

every

case

until

The

Court

1

have

f ai] ure

to

v.

Pulley,

*r<=t»>ute would

.

round

discoverv

occurs

vher

be

favorable

*

ty

~!nirt4"

^

knows or should have k n o w n h e m i g h t have a cause
There

ma^

.

th^4*

finds

Deschamps

plaintifr.

expert medical testimony. '•

fact

.r/ur • does not re qui re an

expert opinion confirming m a l p r a c t i c e
in

i i1

. aintif f' s

t

.:;

concludes t h a t k n o w l e d g e oi a j.e«:i"

tolled

r
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.: a-::icr.

*r: - . -

f

•

"discovery" d o e s not occur until a p l a i n t i f f is absolutely
of the cause of his injury.

sure

For e x a m p l e , :ii n tl le instant

case

there s t i ] 1 a p p e a i: s t o t e a i e a ] f a c 1: qi i e s t i o n a b o i 11 11: I e i i. a 1 \ I r e
and existence of any sexual dysfunction and the cause.
The Court finds the testimony of Dr, Becker concerning
plaint i f f' s c o i I d i t :I o i i

: e credib 1 e ,

D r , B e c k e r stated,

J o n e s has ill defined sexual dysfunction.

O b j e c t i v e evaluation h a s been equivocal

of

ii /I ia t

appears
testimony
of

the

..

still
adduced,,
risk

of

:i 1: :i s a.i id
be

i f :ii t e x i s t s , "

accurate,

T h e court
surgery,

based

fj nds

Dr.

includii ig

". r.

the cause is hard

to pinpoint.
. :.

-ie

ui.cn

: ae

terms

. n.:.,: evaluation

the

- ^r r

in

~:

I.SK

totality
:

of

- .:•-,] ff
if

sexual
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dysfunction, and that the plaintiff knew of this possibility
before surgery; and that he related the sexual dysfunction he
experienced to the surgical process, shortly after undergoing
the second surgery.

The Court finds plaintiff's articulated

desire to have his sperm banked would not have been made but
for knowledge of the risk of sexual dysfunction.
The

Court

has

considered

plaintiff's

demeanor

and

testimony, and finds that the plaintiff's demeanor, attitude
and

the

content

intelligent,

of

careful

his

answers,

man.

reveals

Plaintiff's

reflected a great attention to detail.
further

notes

plaintiff

is

concept of informed consent.

a

lawyer,

him

to

answers

be

in

an

court

The Court so finds and
who

understands

the

The Court finds the plaintiff had

access to the Mayo Clinic pamphlet and read the same.

The

Court finds that the plaintiff clearly testified that in 1984,
he knew of changes in his sexual function or "system", i.e., no
ejaculent and diminished erections (Ex. D-4).
Plaintiff's
masturbated
surgery,

to

and

specific

testimony

"test" his

again

after

sexual
the

at

trial

function

second

was

after

surgery,

that
the

and

he

first

that he

noticed and reported sexual problems in April or May of 1984.
Plaintiff testified

that after the "testing",

following his
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was
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one

okay".

clearly

t e st i f i ed th at

a

1ie

The

plaintiff's

reference

f

-,

'at

reference

surgery.

in a s 11 i r b a t e d

3 eas t
to

:^:.

PI a int i f f

-: ;

•e c o i 1d

and discovered what he perceived to be sexual dysfunction.

a ] so
3 u 1 g e ry
The

plaintiff and his parents, Veda and Garth Jones, testified that
h e :i i s c 1 o s e d 11 1 € s e x u a ] d y s f u n c 11 o :i 1 t c • t: h • 2 n: t i 1 1 I I a y
the surgery was discussed as a cause at that time.
testified

that

he

called

Dr.

Becker

and

: f thi s operation"

the

evidence

sexual

April

dysfunction

or May

experiencing
Becker

of

discussed

sexual

1984, the

plaintiff

no ejaculation.

referrals to D::i
any

The

The

possible

testimony

causes

Mi d'i"- "

:

dysfunction.

-

Dr.

*

at

questions

-in relation
th-r

supports
told

Garth Jones

asked

regarding 11: 1 < 2 "consequences

o f 19 8 4 a 1 1 d

i i 1 ] ate
he

was

reflects that

Dr.

that

Becker

time

ai id

p 1 a i n t i f f' 3 c o n c e r n

a 1: 1 ::> 1 11

made

*v - •

i t :) f 1 13 ther exp 1 : • r e

: ;..

physicians

p l a i n t i f f w a s r e f e r r e d , w e r e a d v i s e d of the d y s f u n c t i o n
and

to

:i t 1: 1 = :i 1 , g

to

wlloin

problem

] i n1:ed

t ::« 11 1 e

c :)

surgery.
Ii 1 E x h i b i t
stated

(a t

D-17, the depositior

5: >. 9 8) , 11: 1 a t

-f r

B e c k e r , rr. B e c k e r

1 , € \ t < : - .1 d

p l a i n t i f f ' s c o m p l a i n t of sexual d y s f u n c t i o n

\
!l

- • •1 j ng

: :? u n l i k e l y to
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be the result of surgery."

However, Dr. Becker goes on to say

that surgery as a cause was discussed and

"surgery was never

ruled out" as a possible cause of the plaintiff's problems.
appears

that

plaintiff

was

on

notice

at

this

time

of

It
the

problem and the potential causes, including the surgery.
The
didn't

Court
relate

surgery

until

finds
his

that

while

sexual

September,

the

plaintiff

dysfunction
1987, that

to
is

testified

nerve

belied

injury
by

the

evidence and by the totality of his own testimony.

he
from

other

Further,

the Court finds that the plaintiff's contention that he didn't
think sexual dysfunction was a real risk, and wasn't advised of
the

same,

testimony,

is

not

credible

in view

of

the

including plaintiff's testimony

totality

of

the

that he considered

and requested his sperm be banked.
The Court finds that when the plaintiff got Dr. Dayton's
opinion in September 1987, this only confirmed the plaintiff's
own conclusion formed in 1984 as to the problem and its cause.
The Court finds that the plaintiff found other theories on
causation
Hammond's
the

unacceptable.
explanation,

dysfunction,

believed

this

to

For

of a possible

incredible
be

example,

the

and
cause.

plaintiff

psychological

"unsatisfactory"
The

plaintiff's

found

Dr.

cause
and

for

never

actions,
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Exhibit

* •

D-, : establishes

Franklin I.. Smith, r; ^

if surgery 1 la ::i caused 1 :i

v

..

...:-."

we r e

-ir\r

tna:.

2 985,

vlogist, w a s asked b y t h e p l a i n t i f f

.. -i em.

'- • -:'

•. "

T h e fact t h a t D r . B e c k e r did n o t a c k n o w l e d g e in 1984 or :i ,ow
that

plaintiff

caused

1: y

has

sur gei y,

knowledge.

is

permanent

sexual

immaterial

t o t h e issue

D r . Frankli:

I,». S m i t h ' s

dysfunction

problem

<^; plaintif '?

testimony

referred

p l a i n t i f f ' s r e q u e s t for i n f o r m a t i o n regarding t h e next is between
surgery
Doctor

a n a sexual
ndicated

dysfunction
the

(See Exhibit

plaintiff

reported

P-14) ai id
sexual

tl .is

problems

starting "after the \ seconc:i operati oi i :i i ,. Fe 1: • ri iai :\, ' c: • f 1 98 i'" .
Finally,

Terry

Stoker's

testimony

supports

the

19 84

discovery by plaintiff.
Ms.

s t o ke r

test i f i e c:i

1

•

"contemplated suing" repeatedly

*»1 a :i n t j f f

1 ie

:i i i < :I :i c a t e d

;•;.» ^;learly states threats of

a lawsuit were made as early as 1985.
The

.

• eatmen t

•i

l

:

:

-•

i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s p a s s e d by t h e V: *h
legislature.
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Based upon the foregoing, the Court orders that counsel for
the

defendants, Mr. Williams,

Findings

of

Fact

consistent with

and

is to

Conclusions

of

prepare
Law,

more
and

this Decision, and submit them

detailed
an

Order

as required

under the Third District Court Rules of Practice.
Dated this

18th

/I

day of December, ljJSl.

Ci ' ^lj{^/~2rz^
LESLIE A . LEWIS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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foregoing

Court's
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following,
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Robert F. Orton
Attorney for Plaintiff
68 S. Main, Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
William T. Evans
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendant Statie of ( J t .al i
3 6 S. State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
David G. Williams
Attorney for Defendants University of
Utah, University Hospital and
James M. Becker, M.D.
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DAVID G. WILLIAMS (A3481)
TERENCE L. ROONEY (A5789)
_
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTI1
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?
Attorneys for Defendants
In -.: -:v c:M .. • r^
The University of Utah, The University
of Utah Hospital and Medical Center,
|, \\\ 2 3 1992
and James M. Becker, M.D.
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
/) ^
Post Office Box 45000
#—•,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521 -9 000

IN THE THIRD II IJDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
G. KEVIN JONES,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs,
THE STATE OF UTAH; THE
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH; THE
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH HOSPITAL
AND MEDICAL CENTER; and JAMES
M BECKER, M n

Civil No. C88-2736

Defendants.

This matter was tried

to the "-r-rt

withou"

- -'-iry

:*

November 12, 13 and 25, 1991. In accordance with . '?-:?-«• "r*~;
(1 9 53 as amended) the tr :i s J
to defendants1
present

was ] urn, t e d I o i he

statute of limitations defense.

at trial

and represented

. -.

Plaintiff was

by ln,<; counsel

Defendants wer e i epresented at tr :i <i I I i v

JS pen ta::i i i:i ng

nf record.

I hv i i : ouni. el n!; record.

Plaintiff and defendants adduced evidence through witnesses and
exhibits and each rested. The Court having heard closi n g ai gi lments
fr<:>iri c o u n s e ]

efendants and having reviewed the

trial briefs submitted by plaintiff and defendants hereby enters
the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

In

1981

plaintiff

ulcerative colitis.
-Azulfddine

and-

was

diagnosed

He was treated

Prednisone

by

as having

chronic

for that condition with

Dr.

Clifford

Harman,

a

gastroenterologist, through December 1983.
2.

In November

1982 plaintiff consulted with Dr. James

Becker at the University of Utah School of Medicine concerning
surgical options for treatment of his ulcerative colitis, including
specifically the ileoanal anastomosis procedure. Between November
1982 and December 1983 plaintiff's parents also visited with Dr.
Becker regarding surgical options for treatment of plaintiff's
disease.
3.

In October 1983 plaintiff visited the Mayo Clinic in

Rochester, Minnesota where Dr. Huizenga, a gastroenterologist,
confirmed the diagnosis of chronic ulcerative colitis and entered
plaintiff into a study protocol for an investigational drug (5ASA)
for the treatment of ulcerative colitis.
4.

Plaintiff did not respond favorably to the 5ASA treatment

and in December 1983 his ulcerative colitis became so severe that
he was admitted to Holy Cross Hospital.

In the opinion of his

treating gastroenterologist, Dr. Harman, medical therapies had been
exhausted and surgery was necessary to save plaintiff's life.
5.

In January 1984 plaintiff and his parents discussed the

surgical options with Dr. Becker. Plaintiff elected to undergo the
-2-

ileoanal anastomosis procedure after having been fully informed
concerning the risks and benefits of that procedure and of the
alternative procedures.
6.

Dr. Becker advised plaintiff that the risk of sexual

dysfunction was lower with the ileoanal anastomosis procedure than
with the alternative procedures, but that sexual dysfunction was
a risk of the procedure.
7.

In January 1984 Dr. Becker explained to plaintiff that

the ileoanal anastomosis procedure would be performed in three
separate operations.
8.

On January 5, 1984, the first phase of the ileoanal

anastomosis, removal of most of the colon and the creation of a
temporary ileostomy, was performed by Dr. Becker on plaintiff.
9.

The first phase of the procedure was completed without

complications.

Following completion of the first phase and prior

to the second phase of the procedure, plaintiff masturbated to test
his sexual function. At that time he felt relieved and stated "at
least I got through that one okay", referring to the first surgery.
10.
phase

of

On February 27, 1984, plaintiff underwent the second
the

ileoanal

anastomosis

procedure,

the

mucosal

proctectomy or removal of the mucosal lining from the rectum.
Again, prior to

this procedure

the

risks were

explained to

plaintiff by Dr. Becker, including the risk of sexual dysfunction.
11.

In April

or May

1984 plaintiff discovered what he

perceived to be sexual dysfunction, including lack of ejaculation
and diminished frequency and quality of erections.

-3-

12.

In May 1984 plaintiff reported his perceived sexual

dysfunction to his parents and to Dr. Becker.

At that time he

reported to Dr. Becker that he had been told by his family doctor
that he might be impotent, secondary to his surgery.
13.

In May

1984 Dr. Becker

referred

plaintiff

to Dr.

Middleton, a urologist, and to Dr. Hammond, a psychologist and sex
therapist, to explore the reported sexual dysfunction.
14.

Since May 1984, in discussions and correspondence with

various physicians, plaintiff has repeatedly causally related his
perceived sexual dysfunction to the second operative procedure
performed in February 1984.
15.

Since April or May 1984, plaintiff has had an ill defined

sexual dysfunction, the cause of which has not been definitively
determined. pfe^c±J.ve_eval^
clTarAf^injg^h^
16.

Beginning

in

May

1984

and

continuing

thereafter,

plaintiff knew and reasonably should have known that the second
surgery performed in February 1984 was a possible cause of his
perceived sexual dysfunction and that he might have a cause of
action against defendants.
17.

Plaintiff did not accept or rely upon any other theories

of causation suggested by defendants or any other physicians.
Specifically,

plaintiff

rejected

and

did

not

rely

upon

any

suggestion that there may be a psychological cause of his perceived
sexual dysfunction.

18*

Plaintiff was never misled or deceived

in any manner

concerning the possible causes of his perceived sexual dysfunction.
19.

Defendants did not fraudulently represent or conceal any

information

relevant

to

plaintiff's

treatment,

recovery

or

perceived sexual dysfunction.
2Q-.—Br-.—Mera-4-1—Dayton—"did—not

provide

pT¥iirti-ff-

sLnfoxmati-on—i-n—September—±9&?—eoncerniTrg -""possible

causes

^^j3iatif-£JH5--i>e

of

was nor

previous ly—aware*:
2$.

During the years 1984 and 1985 plaintiff considered suing

defendants for medical malpractice based on his perceived sexual
dysfunction and general dissatisfaction with the outcome of his
surgeries.
2&.

On June

28, 1984

the

third

and

final

phase

of

the

ileoanal anastomosis procedure was performed and completed.
2%

All surgeries and treatment performed and rendered by

defendants were provided at the University of Utah Medical Center.
2%.

Dr. Becker was at all times relevant hereto a full time

employee and faculty member in the Department of Surgery at the
University of Utah School of Medicine.
2$-.

Plaintiff's Notice of Intent to Commence Action was not

served until December 4, 1987.
2^.

This action was commenced April 26, 1988.

2jn

Plaintiff's action was not commenced within two years

after he knew and reasonably should have known of his perceived
sexual dysfunction and general dissatisfaction with the outcome of
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his surgeries and that he might have a claim for malpractice
against defendants.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes
the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The applicable statute of limitations in this case is §

78-14-4, UCA (1953 as amended),
2.

Plaintiff's action was not commenced within the time

required by § 78-14-4 and his action is therefore barred.
3*

The two year limitation period provided in § 78-14-4

commences when the plaintiff discovers or through the use of
reasonable diligence should have discovered that he or she has an
injury and that he or she might have a cause of action based on the
injury. Commencement of the limitation period is not delayed until
a plaintiff is advised by an "expert" that a valid claim exists or
otherwise knows with certainty the cause of the injury or that the
defendants were negligent.
4.

An action is commenced for purposes of the statute of

limitations when the complaint is filed, but in this case the
action was not timely whether the commencement of action is deemed
to be December 4, 1987 when the Notice of Intent was served, or
April 26, 1988 when the Complaint was filed.
5.

In addition to the relevant findings of fact, the Court

concludes as a matter of law, that defendants did not fraudulently
conceal any alleged misconduct and that plaintiff was not prevented

-6-
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from discovering any misconduct on the part of defendants by any
fraudulent concealment.
6.

The "continuing treatment doctrine" is not applicable

since the legislature passed § 78-14-4, UCA (1953 as amended).
7.

The continuing treatment doctrine would not apply to this

case, even in the absence of § 78-14-4, because of the Court's
factual findings that plaintiff possessed all of the knowledge and
information pertaining to his alleged injury and possible causes
during the time he was being treated by defendants which he
possessed at the time he commenced this action and he was not
misled or prevented from obtaining any information as a result of
the continuing treatment.
8.

Because plaintiff's action was not commenced within the

time required by § 78-14-4, the applicable statute of limitations,
it is not necessary for the Court to rule on defendants1 defense
that the action was not commenced within the shorter period of time
required by S 63-30-12, UCA (1953 as amended).
DATED this U^

^day of January, 1992.
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

PATRICIA C. WHITE, being duly sworn, says that she is employed
by the law offices of Snow, christensen & Martineau, attorneys for
defendants The University of Utah, The university of Utah Hospital
and Medical Center and James M. Becker, M.D. herein; that she
served the attached FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW (Number
C88-2736, Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County) upon
the parties listed below by placing a true and correct copy thereof
in an envelope addressed to:
Robert F. Orton
MARSDEN, ORTON, CAHOON & GOTTFREDSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff
68 South Main Street, Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, on
the

^

day of January, 1992

Paftricia C. White /
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

Q

day of January,

1992

NOTARY PUBL,
Residing i
he State of Utah
My commission Expires

NOTARY PUBLIC

September!
STATE OF UTAH
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